Rolling With the 2d Marine Division
interview with Lieutenant General William M. Keys, USMC
U.S. Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS, November 1991
PROCEEDINGS: The Marine Corps bases on the West Coast started emptying out almost immediately, once the balloon went up. What was going on at Camp Lejeune?
Keys: Everyone was tracking the situation, and some units were getting ready to go. Initially, all that mounted out was the 4th MEB [Marine Expeditionary Brigade], which was in process of loading out for Norway, to conduct an annual NATO exercise in the Teamwork series. After a little reconfiguring, they deployed to the Indian Ocean. The ground combat element of the 4th MEB was the 2d Marine Regiment, which left me with two infantry regiments--the 6th Marines and 8th Marines. Since it was quite possibly headed for combat, we let the 4th MEB go out a lot heavier than we should have--particularly in the combat service support elements. I guess we figured that someday we'd link up out there, but I never saw the 2d Marines again, for the duration of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In the meantime they were floating around with assets that the rest of us would need when the time arrived for us to mount out. There's a lesson in there somewhere. Between August and December, we tried to track developments in Southwest Asia through situation reports and intelligence briefs. We received several warning orders that were later canceled: first, to send another regiment; next, to mount out another MEB, this one designated to marry up with gear carried into the theater of operations by an MPS [Maritime Prepositioning Ships] squadron. Late in November, we got the word that the entire 2d Marine Division would go over there and fight under command of I MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force], which in effect would become a corps-level command.
When we received the mount-out order, I still had the two active-duty regiments--the 6th Marines and the 8th Marines. The rest of the 2d Division was filled out with reserves, about 4,000 of them. We filled up our holes and added an extra Reserve tank battalion. We had a comprehensive individual training program for each reservist: rifle range, gas mask, Code of Conduct--the whole works. At the same time, we were giving the same training to the reservists who were destined to join the 1st Marine Division, already deployed to Southwest Asia. We put about 15,000 reservists through this program in roughly one month. Camp Lejeune looked like it must have looked during World War II, with Marines reporting at all hours of the day and night, finding temporary billeting in a tent or barracks, then starting out the first thing next morning to train for combat. We began flying the 2d Division to Saudi Arabia around 12 December. The shipping for our heavy gear and supplies (one MPS squadron plus 18 break-bulk ships) had begun sailing around the last of November and continued through December. All our gear had arrived by the middle of January; all the troops were there by year's end.
PROCEEDINGS: Then you got some reinforcements in Saudi Arabia, didn't you?
Keys: We took operational control of a U.S. Army tank brigade--the "Tiger Brigade" [1st Brigade, 2nd Armored Division]. They came fully equipped with M-1 tanks and were a first-class outfit. They had been together as a unit for about two years, and had been through the National Training Center (the Army's stateside equivalent of the Marine Air-Ground Combat Center in the Mojave Desert]. Their commander and officers really knew their stuff. We spent the first few days getting to know each other, getting briefed on each other's procedures. That was much less of a problem than you might think. We go to their schools; they go to our schools. A lot of our training and doctrine is the same. Before long, we were one tight division. Right at the beginning, I told the Tiger Brigade that they were my third regiment, and would be treated the same as the other two. This made a great difference to them and paid off greatly later. Those Army tankers now wear the 2d Marine Division patch on their right sleeves--to signify their service with the Marines in combat. At the time we assumed operational control, they were located about 80 miles away, in a relatively good training area. I saw no point in moving them closer, so they stayed there until the first week in January and conducted their own training exercises. We'd go down there to observe and to coordinate some things with them that I wanted to do.
PROCEEDINGS: When did you begin moving toward your eventual attack positions?
Keys: About 28 December, the first elements of the division moved north. I wanted to move units into the field as soon as they got their equipment, and get on with some serious training. We moved into a place called the Triangle area--which was in fact a triangle, lying between three hard-topped roadsabout 50 miles north of Al Jubayl. Within two weeks, the entire division was up at the Triangle. We built a training range that could handle all the weapons of a mechanized and armored assault force, and we developed a complex of obstacles for use in training for breaching operations. In addition to their other work, every unit went through a standard syllabus that took about five training days. About the middle of January, we moved northwest to the left of the 1st Marine Division, about 12 miles below the border with Kuwait. We stayed there about two weeks, and--as we did everywhere we stopped--we kept on training. This is where we had our first significant contact with Iraqi forces. Some of our light armored vehicles had a skirmish with Iraqi tanks along the border and killed five, as I recall.
PROCEEDINGS: What were the Iraqis doing at this time? Were they trying to run any probes, any reconnaissance missions?
Keys: They would come up to the border at night, and if they did anything beyond that, it didn't go very deep. It was the same with us. CentCom didn't want anybody in the I MEF sector launching combat-reconnaissance missions into Kuwait at this point. The concern was starting the ground war early. Our plans changed as circumstances changed. About the first week of February, General [Walter E.] Boomer [Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force] approved a plan that called for the 1st Marine Division to conduct the breaching operation. The 2d Division would pass through the 1st Division's lines and become the exploitation force. At the time, we were driven to the one-division breach concept of operations because we didn't seem to have enough heavy breaching equipment to support two divisions.
There were many, many problems associated with this plan. For one, it was difficult to get the two divisions together for training and rehearsing. When we finally did some passage-of-lines rehearsing, it did not go well. Since both divisions were heavily mechanized, we might have had a column of vehicles stretching back 30 miles, just getting lined up for the attack. I personally did not care for this plan, but would have supported it if we were driven to it by the lack of breaching equipment. But by 7 or 8 February, some additional equipment from the Israelis and the U.S. Army had arrived. In addition, my Tiger Brigade had some built-in breaching capability, and knew how to use it--in fact, they gave us a lot of help in planning the entire assault. So I went to General Boomer and asked him to consider my alternative plan. He agreed, and I showed him what I wanted to do. It was rather radical. It called for moving the 2d Division another 80 miles to the northwest and breaching right through one of the Iraqi oil fields. The field we picked was supposedly one of the worst, because of heavy concentrations of hydrogen gas. But we had two or three Kuwaiti resistance fighters with us, and one--who had worked in that field--said that we could probably get through it. If things got too bad, we could always use our gas masks. They were not the most effective filtering devices for hydrogen, but they would do in a crunch. As I presented this plan to General Boomer, I related my confidence in my subordinate unit commanders and the Marines and soldiers of the 2d Division and I guess it showed through--because he approved the plan (pending General Schwarzkopf's approval). This brought about a major change in the I MEF concept of operations.
PROCEEDINGS: It also brought about a major change in the logistical support concept, didn't it?
Keys: It sure did. Brigadier General [C.C.] Chuck Krulak [commanding the Direct Support Command] was there, and General Boomer asked him if he could support the new plan. Chuck said he could, but not from his current location. So in two weeks he carved out a massive logistical support area in the desert, where he was able to support both divisions. I just want to add this about General Krulak and his Direct Support Command. They were right up there with us the entire way, and we owe a large part of our success in the attack to Chuck Krulak as an individual and to the superb performers in his command. Next, General [H. Norman] Schwarzkopf [Commanding General, the Central Command] came down. We briefed him and he said the plan sounded good. So we were cleared for action. As another aside, I think General Schwarzkopf was a superlative commander--a commander's commander. You could just tell that he
knew what he was doing. He instilled a lot of confidence in his general officers. I have a lot of respect for the man as an individual, a soldier, and a commander.
PROCEEDINGS: What happened next?
Keys: I directed the 6th Marine Regiment to prepare to conduct the breach. We would do a one-regiment breach, with each battalion, in turn, cutting two lanes through the barrier. We moved the 6th Marines into a sterile area and started to construct an exact replica of the barrier line that we would have to breach. We gathered all the intelligence we could on the area. We sent people back to CentCom headquarters, and we even sent the Division Engineer back to the Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington, D.C., for anything they could find. From photos and imagery we developed a schematic map with a scale of 1:25,000. The Division Engineers did a superb job of building a barrier to scale, in a short time. Then their commanding officer, Colonel Larry Livingston, Commanding Officer of the 6th Marines, took his units through, battalion by battalion. After one week of training, he reported that he was ready to go. I cant say enough about the way he put it all together. Next, we moved everybody some 80 miles to the breach area. Our moves over there were mostly self-moves. I had an extra truck company attached to the division, and a total of 672 trucks at my disposal--and I needed every one of them. At times when I needed more, I could rely on our Force Service Support Group and even contracted civilian trucks--but as we got closer to the war, the civilian trucks got less dependable. My point is that--especially in the desert--you need trucks and logistical vehicles to accomplish your
mission, and the only vehicles you can count on in every situation are the ones that actually belong to you.
PROCEEDINGS: Once you got near the breach site, how did you organize your forces for the attack?
Keys: I put the division in a laydown site, in the order they would go into the assault. The 6th Marines were right in front of the area to be breached. The second unit through would be the Tiger Brigade, followed by the 8th Marines. I sent the Army tank brigade second--to lead the exploitation forces--because they were totally equipped with night-vision devices. The Marines were limited in this regard, but every soldier had what he needed and every Army vehicle had what it needed, and it was the best gear on the market. They truly had an exceptional night-fighting capability, and it made a difference. My thinking was that if the initial penetration by the 6th Marines went slowly, and dragged into late afternoon or evening, the Tiger Brigade could move up and complete the breach during hours of darkness. My overall aim was to push as much combat power as possible through those
two breach lanes, as quickly as possible. Going into the assault, the 2d Marine Division had a strength of about 20,500, with 257 tanks, including 185 M-1s. It was probably the heaviest Marine division--with the most combat power--ever to take the field. The assault was scheduled for 22 February. General Schwarzkopf asked if we'd be ready to go. I said, "Yes. I'd like to have more time, but I'll be ready to go into the assault then, if that's the date." He said, "What I'm more concerned about is the weather." We delayed the assault for two days, waiting for better weather. The
weather just got worse. So we put our heads down and kicked off the assault on 24February, even though the weather was still rotten. The night before, we had made 18 cuts in the berm line with artillery, so we were ready for a fast start. But the morning fog was so dense that we couldn't see 100 yards ahead. With visibility that bad, we couldn't count on much in the way of close air support--but we punched on through. Contrary to some reports, the Iraqis were still there, waiting for us. They fired about 300 rounds of artillery as we worked to breach the minefields, but they had no forward observers to coax the fire on target, so we could discount the prospect of heavy casualties from their shots in the dark. Aside from mines, Iraqi
artillery had been my major concern, so I felt early on that we were off to a good start. We punched on through the barrier, and by the evening of the first day all of the 6th Marines, the Tiger Brigade, and four battalions of artillery had moved through the breach. The following morning, I brought the 8th Marines through, and we prepared to continue the attack that afternoon with the Tiger Brigade on the left, the 6th Marines in the center, and the 8th Marines on the right. Light armored vehicles, which had entered Kuwait early (CentCom's policy had changed late in the game), performed scouting and reconnaissance missions on the left flank, while units from the division's reconnaissance battalion screened the right flank. I need to digress again. The light armored vehicles, in their first combat test with the Marines, really proved their worth--shooting and moving, shooting and moving. They killed more Iraqi tanks than we realized at first, and they took the first Iraqi prisoners. An Iraqi general we captured on the second day told us that he misidentified the first infiltration of light armored vehicles as the main armored attack, even though we had planned it as more of a diversionary attack. Intelligence sources told us that we would probably come into contact with the 80th Iraqi Tank Brigade, their operational reserve force, attacking into our center. But large-scale attacks never materialized, and we now think that the 80th Brigade was just folded back into the Iraqi 5th Mechanized Division, which both the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions eventually chopped to pieces. We captured 5,000 Iraqi prisoners the first day. They would take us under fire. We would return fire with effect--killing a few--and then they would just quit. That proved to be the pattern for the entire 100-hour war. Once we took them under heavy fire, they'd fire a few more rounds, then quit.
On the morning of the third day, General Boomer cleared me to drive on Kuwait City, using the Tiger Brigade to envelop to the west, sealing off an area called Al Jahar. Around 1000 that morning, I called in my subordinate commanders to give them mission-type orders. I didn't give them much time to prepare, but they still managed to jump off around noontime. When we got within ten miles of Kuwait City, I cut the Tiger Brigade loose to envelop to the left. They sealed a major intersection on the escape route to Iraq, and trapped thousands of fleeing Iraqis. By the evening of the third day, we were poised to enter the city the next morning. In the morning, the word came
down: "Don't go." The Coalition forces from the region had been selected to enter Kuwait City. The following evening, we met with them at Al Jahar, to coordinate the
passage of lines. We held onto a line called the Six-Ring Road; they passed through our lines and entered the city. That was the plan all along.
PROCEEDINGS: What about the timing of the cease-fire?
Keys: I think it probably came at the right time. At least it seemed that way when the word came down. In retrospect, it is clear that we could have done a lot more damage to the Iraqi forces if we had pressed on more quickly. It now appears that they started bugging out of Kuwait as soon as we crossed the southern border. But at the time it would not have made sense to expose our forces to counterattacks by overextending ourselves, under the assumption that the enemy would never fight. That's how it looked at division level, anyway. Overall, I tend to agree with the President: If we had pursued the retreating forces into Iraq, we'd still be in Iraq now--and would probably be there for the next hundred years. We didn't manage to nail the major culprit in all of this, but we did what we had set out to do.
PROCEEDINGS: A few questions still linger, after the war. How effective was your intelligence support?
Keys: At the strategic level, it was fine. But we did not get enough tactical intelligence--front-line battle intelligence. The RPV [remotely piloted vehicle] worked very well, but we needed many more of them, plus Systems to disseminate their information to all units that needed it. In my opinion, the RPV is going to be our best tactical intelligence-gathering vehicle in the future, and we need to develop that program. Our electronic warfare assets--for example, the Radio Battalion-worked
very well. We also received a lot of information from Marine aviation. They'd fly a mission, and when they got back they'd immediately call the division's combat operations center to report whatever they saw. That was close to real-time intelligence support. I guess that our biggest overall intelligence shortcoming was in building Saddam Hussein and his forces into a monster that just wasn't there. Going into the battle, this made us more gunshy than we should have been.
Certainly, the Iraqis had more equipment and capability than any force we've ever faced. But the fighting spirit just was not there. The individual foot-soldiers were badly abused by their leaders--not necessarily their military leaders, but their government--and low morale was the result. I think their senior military leaders knew what they were doing. After we seized Kuwait City, we uncovered several sand tables depicting their defenses that were incredibly detailed. They were fully prepared for us. They had thousands of weapons and millions of rounds of small-arms and tank ammunition--so they could have put up one hell of a fight if they had wanted
to. Their defensive areas were well organized, and had they chosen to put their hearts into it, we would have had a real fight on our hands. I guess it all boils down to the fact that the individual Iraqi soldier did not measure up to, say, the North Vietnamese soldier. The Iraqis were not ready to die for what they believed in--whatever that was.
And that's it in a nutshell.
